South Korea’s Supreme Court has scheduled back-to-back full bench hearings in former Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung’s election law appeal, an unusually swift timeline with potential implications for the country’s upcoming presidential election.

A guilty verdict before voters go to the polls on June 3 would send the case back to the lower courts, effectively weakening front-runner Lee’s prospects of winning the election.

But the available evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision to take up Lee’s case so quickly reflects institutional caution rather than a rush to deliver a verdict before the election, though the judiciary may not be able to avoid getting caught up in the country’s increasingly fractious politics.

UNUSUAL SPEED, UNUSUAL CONTEXT

The Supreme Court’s rapid scheduling of Lee’s case has raised eyebrows across Seoul. Within a day of receiving the appeal from the Seoul High Court, the case was reassigned to the court’s full bench. The first hearing took place on Tuesday, while a second session was scheduled for Thursday.

In ordinary circumstances, the court’s full bench convenes only once a month. Hearings are typically slow to arrange, and complex cases involving legal nuance or public attention tend to proceed at a deliberate pace. That Lee’s case is moving this fast has led some observers to speculate that the justices are preparing to rule before the June 3 snap presidential election.

But based on Korea Pro’s analysis, the Supreme Court’s pace appears less about outcome and more about optics. With judicial impartiality under close scrutiny and the country already navigating constitutional uncertainty following former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s removal from office, the court appears to be sending a message: It is working, and it is not afraid to take on politically sensitive cases.

That message is deliberate. The justices know that inaction ahead of the election could provoke accusations of dereliction — especially as Lee, the frontrunner, faces legal challenges that have already led many voters to question his legitimacy.

Inaugural ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Ma Yong-ju, April 9, 2025 | Image: ROK Supreme Court

DEMOCRATIC PARTY’S CALCULATED MESSAGE

The DP has seized on the court’s schedule to reinforce its political narrative. Park Gyun-taek, head of the Lee Jae-myung campaign’s legal support team stated that the party still believes it is “unlikely” the Supreme Court will issue a verdict before the election. The comment, echoed in press briefings and interviews, serves multiple functions.

On the surface, the DP appears to be managing expectations, cautioning supporters against assuming that a favorable ruling will arrive in time to impact the vote. Beneath that, the DP’s strategy appears to be to frame any delay as unfortunate but understandable, while simultaneously projecting confidence that Lee will be acquitted.

The court’s speed plays into this dynamic. It allows the DP to argue that the judiciary is taking the case seriously, even if a ruling doesn’t come in time. If Lee is acquitted after winning the presidency, the party will portray the verdict as long-delayed vindication. If the ruling arrives beforehand, the DP can credit the court for its independence.

Meanwhile, the ruling People Power Party has intensified its calls for a prompt ruling, framing the case as a litmus test for the rule of law. Party spokesperson Shin Dong-wook urged the court to issue a “swift and fair” verdict, arguing that prolonged proceedings have already sown public confusion and eroded judicial credibility.

TWO CLOCKS, ONE COLLISION COURSE

The central tension lies in timing. Under Article 270 of the Public Official Election Act, the Supreme Court must deliver a ruling within three months of receiving an appeal. For Lee’s case, that deadline falls on June 26 — roughly three weeks after the June 3 snap election.

If Lee wins the presidency and no verdict has been delivered, the implications are profound. Article 84 of South Korea’s Constitution shields sitting presidents from criminal prosecution, with exceptions only for insurrection and treason. That means the court would either have to suspend proceedings or defer judgment until after Lee leaves office.

This is uncharted legal territory. South Korea has never had a president still under criminal appeal on election law charges. The court knows this, and its scheduling reflects awareness that time is running out — not necessarily to rule, but to prepare for the legal, political and constitutional consequences of whichever outcome ultimately arrives.

Lee Jae-myung takes part in a Democratic Party primary race, April 20, 2025 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

WHY THE COURT WON’T RUSH

Even with the procedural momentum, legal precedent suggests that the court will resist delivering a hasty decision. For instance, during the 2015 sedition case involving former lawmaker Lee Seok-ki, the Supreme Court proceeded cautiously over an extended timeline.

While different in nature, both cases reinforce a pattern: When judicial decisions intersect with high-profile political stakes, the court favors deliberation over expediency, often taking weeks or months to build consensus, especially in cases where the implications are political as much as legal.

Moreover, the court is risk-averse by design. A rushed verdict that affects the outcome of a presidential election would all but guarantee accusations of judicial interference. Conversely, delaying a ruling could be spun as institutional cowardice. The court’s current course — fast hearings, but no promises — is likely a middle path.

Unless the justices reach a consensus in the coming weeks, it is unlikely that they will be able to issue a decision before the vote, making the court’s back-to-back full bench hearings more symbolic than outcome-driven.

WHAT’S AT STAKE

The consequences of this case extend far beyond Seoul. If Lee Jae-myung becomes president while his legal status remains unresolved, South Korea will face a legitimacy crisis with global ramifications.

To many conservatives, Lee’s victory will not signal democratic consensus but will instead perceive it as the result of legal manipulation. That perception will not remain confined to domestic politics. Washington has strategic interests in ensuring allies like South Korea remain politically stable.

Moreover, a prolonged suspension of judicial proceedings would feed narratives that South Korea’s democracy is unable to hold its highest office to account. That, in turn, could dampen investor confidence and complicate diplomatic coordination at a time when regional security and economic cooperation are under strain.

This is not merely about Lee. It is about whether South Korea’s presidency remains a symbol of public trust or a contested prize in a cycle of legal warfare.

The Supreme Court’s fast-tracking of Lee Jae-myung’s appeal is likely an effort to balance institutional legitimacy with legal prudence. The hearings may continue, but unless the justices are unusually unified, a verdict before the election remains improbable.

Whatever verdict the court delivers — or declines to deliver — it will shape how South Koreans view the judiciary for years to come. The question is no longer whether the court will rule quickly. It’s whether it can still command public trust when it does.

Edited by Alannah Hill